Introduction
Over the past decade, the landscape of peace operations in Africa has undergone a fundamental transformation. Since 2017, four major UN peacekeeping operations have been scaled back, and since 2014, the UN Security Council has not authorized any new “blue helmet” missions. Against this backdrop, there has been a steady growth in African‑led peace support operations (African-led Peace Support Operations, PSOs). The African Union (AU) has evolved from a supporting element of the UN system into an independent – albeit financially dependent – actor in ensuring security on the continent. Understanding the architecture, mandate frameworks, and mechanisms of interaction between the AU and the UN is critically important for assessing the prospects for resolving African conflicts.
– Structure: African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
The operational capacity of the AU is based on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 and the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of 2002. Its key elements are:
1. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the central decision‑making body. The PSC is a permanent decision‑making body responsible for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. It consists of 15 members elected by the AU Executive Council on the basis of the principle of equitable regional representation. three seats from Central Africa, three from Eastern Africa, two from Northern Africa, three from Southern Africa, and four from Western Africa. It is important that the PSC has no permanent members and no veto power; the chairmanship rotates monthly. The PSC meets at least twice a month at the ambassadorial level and operates on a continuous basis.
2. The AU Commission is the executive body. The AU Commission’s Peace and Security Department (PSD) includes specialized divisions: for defence and security (DSD), conflict management (CMD), and peace support operations (PSOD), which is responsible for planning, deploying, and managing missions.
The emblem of the African Union
3. The African Standy Force (ASF). The ASF is conceived as five regional brigades (one for each region of the continent), ready for rapid deployment. The PSC provides overall policy guidance and oversight for the ASF brigades.
4. Auxiliary mechanisms. The PSC relies on a Panel of the Wise (five reputable African figures representing the regions for preventive diplomacy and "quiet" mediation missions), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Peace Fund. PSC also coordinates its activities with regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs).
– Mandate: powers and types of operations
PSC is the only body authorized to authorize and terminate AU peace support operations. Its mandate includes: preventing disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that could lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; conducting peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and peace support operations (PSOs); recommending intervention in a member state in the event of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (the “not indifferent” principle); and imposing sanctions and implementing the AU’s common defence policy.
According to the typology agreed upon by the AU and the UN, African‑led peace support operations are divided into observation missions, preventive deployment missions, peace enforcement missions (including those operating in parallel with a UN mission), and post‑peace enforcement stabilization missions. Since 2003, the AU has deployed nine of its own operations and four missions authorized by the AU, including AMISOM in Somalia, MISCA in the Central African Republic, AFISMA in Mali, AMIS in Darfur, and operations in Burundi and the Comoros.
A characteristic feature of African PSOs is the focus on peace enforcement. If the UN defines the protection of civilians as a system‑wide task of a peacekeeping mission with a strong civilian and police component, the AU views protection primarily through the neutralization of armed groups and the creation of a protective environment, which implies a more decisive use of force.
UN stabilization missions in Haiti
Interaction with the UN: from “one‑off support” to institutionalized partnership
The legal basis for interaction is Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to authorize the actions of regional organizations, including the AU, to maintain international peace and security.
In practice, several models of cooperation have emerged. Authorization and logistical support: many AU operations received financial and logistical support from the UN. In the case of AMISOM, the Security Council authorized the operation under Chapter VII of the Charter, which granted it broader powers to use force. The UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa serves as the main liaison on issues of peace and security.
Next, it is worth mentioning hybrid operations and “transitions”: the most well‑known example of a hybrid mission is UNAMID in Darfur (2007–2020), jointly administered by the UN and the AU. Another stable model is the transfer of missions from the AU to the UN: AMIB in Burundi was transferred to ONUB (2004), AMIS in Darfur to UNAMID (2007), MISCA in the Central African Republic to MINUSCA (2014), and AFISMA in Mali to MINUSMA (2013). In Somalia, AMISOM was reconfigured into ATMIS (2022), and then into AUSSOM (the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia), the mandate of which was supported by the UN.
A qualitative shift occurred with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023), which established the framework conditions for using UN contributions to finance AU operations authorized by the Security Council. In October 2024, the UN Secretary‑General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission approved a Joint Roadmap for the operationalization of the resolution, covering four priority areas: joint planning and decision‑making, mission support, financing and budgeting, and issues related to the protection of civilians. By September 2025, joint planning and support modalities had been approved, creating a “predictable, coordinated, and collaborative architecture” for future cases.
The annual joint consultative meetings of the PSC of the AU and the UN Security Council (the 19th was held in Addis Ababa in October 2025) serve as a platform for aligning approaches to operations (in particular, AUSSOM), the situation in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes.
Conclusion
African peace support operations have important comparative advantages: geographical proximity, rapid deployment, better understanding of local conditions, and a willingness to use force in situations where UN peacekeepers act with greater restraint. It was the AU that took on the most risky enforcement operations (AMISOM, MISCA, AFISMA) while the UN focused on long‑term peacebuilding.
However, fundamental limitations also persist. Funding for AU PSOs remains less stable and flexible than that for UN operations, depending on the AU Peace Fund, bilateral partners, and, increasingly, on UN contributions through the mechanisms of Resolution 2719. Gaps persist in approaches to the protection of civilians: the UN relies on a comprehensive mandate and a civilian component, while the AU focuses on the forceful suppression of threats. Finally, coordination between the PSC and the UN Security Council, despite regular meetings, does not always lead to the development of a unified strategy before the start of an operation.
Nevertheless, the trajectory is clear: the African Union has ceased to be the UN’s “junior partner” in matters of peace and security. It has its own institutional architecture, mandated tools, and growing operational experience. Interaction with the UN is shifting from the “authorisation – support – handover” model to a model of joint planning, co‑financing, and sharing of responsibility under Resolution 2719. It is precisely on the basis of how effectively this model is implemented in practice — especially given the ongoing shortage of resources and political will — that it will be determined whether African peacekeeping will become a stable pillar of global security or remain a crisis‑driven “ad‑hoc” response tool.
Tags: African Union, Peace and Security Council, peace support operations, African Peace and Security Architecture, UN, Resolution 2719, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, AUSSOM, APSA
