In October 2026, the global energy and trade sectors sent two symmetrical signals. In Brussels, the European Commission stated that the ban on the import of Russian gas “will remain in force” regardless of the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine and negotiations on the possible restoration of Nord Stream; during the same period, gas exchange prices in Europe exceeded $1,200 per thousand cubic meters for the first time in nearly four years. At the same time, Washington and Beijing were formalizing another extension of the trade truce, well aware that rare‑earth metals, semiconductors, and control over them now perform the same function that gas had played for decades in relations between Moscow and Brussels.
The two cases are the EU–Russia gas conflict and the US–China trade war: despite their outward differences, demonstrate the same mechanism. Interdependence turns into a foreign‑policy lever when one of the parties controls the “turning point”: infrastructure, a resource, or a narrow group of goods without which the counterparty’s economy functions less effectively. However, both the lever and the resilience to its use have an expiration date: time works against the one who maintains the dependency and in favor of the one who manages to establish a replacement.
Dismantling the dependency contract
The EU–Russia gas decoupling went through several stages, each of which refined the price of interdependence. In 2022, the decline in supplies and the cessation of pumping via Nord Stream collapsed the European market: quotes soared to almost $1,900 per thousand cubic meters. On January 1, 2025, the contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz expired — Ukrainian transit stopped, and with it, the last “soft” scenario for maintaining the connection was closed. In the autumn of 2025, Brussels moved from political slogans to legal action: the 19th package of sanctions (on October 23, 2025) included a phased ban on the import of Russian LNG starting from April 25, 2026, for short‑term contracts, and from January 1, 2027, for long‑term contracts. On January 26, 2026, 27 EU countries legally established a regulation on the phased withdrawal from Russian pipeline gas and LNG: a complete ban on LNG will come into force at the beginning of 2027, and on pipeline gas — in the autumn of 2027. It is noteworthy that Brussels emphasizes that the ban is enshrined in separate legislation and “is not linked to either sanctions or geopolitical events,” meaning it is declared to have no predetermined duration.
The new geography of the confrontation between the United States and China.
It is important that the regulation includes both an emergency valve (the commission may suspend the ban for up to four weeks if the energy supply is threatened) and strict fines of up to 40 million euros for companies or up to 0.5% of global turnover. But the most important aspect of this structure is the transformation of energy dependence into a manageable legal process: the decision is no longer revoked by a change in the political situation; it must be implemented by the deadline. That is precisely why the European Commission’s press service cut off the question of returning Nord Stream even in the package of a hypothetical peace settlement on October 29, 2026.
Cost calculator: how a lever that is no longer engaged works
The paradox of autumn 2026 is that the market is behaving as if the Russian pipeline is still a lever. In autumn, gas prices in Europe rose by almost 50%; on October 28, exchange quotations exceeded 100 euros per MWh for the first time since December 2022, and on October 30, this was equivalent to 1,200 dollars per thousand cubic meters. Gazprom’s head, Alexey Miller, suggested that during a cold winter, prices “could reach 2,500 dollars at peak levels”; Vladimir Putin had previously issued a similar warning. Wholesale electricity in Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland was trading above 550 euros per MWh at the end of October.
At the same time, the objective picture is ambivalent. On the one hand, the EU’s refusal worked: after the ban on short‑term purchases of Russian LNG in April, imports fell by 46 % in August, to a record low, and at the beginning of 2026, Russia accounted for only about 13 % of the EU’s gas imports (compared to more than 40 % in 2021). On the other hand, business responded in kind: in September 2026, purchases of Russian LNG increased by 60%, returning to the level of a year earlier; Hungary and Slovakia filed lawsuits against the Brussels ban; dozens of shipments of petroleum products from third countries, produced from Russian oil, passed through EU ports. Russian LNG still accounts for about 15% of Europe’s LNG imports — a flow that is being legally “pushed out” but continues to operate economically until the end of 2027.
The fragile tariff truce between Washington and Beijing
The political layer is no less revealing. The Donald Trump administration made the resumption of Russian gas supplies to Europe an element of the peace plan: according to The New York Times and The Economist, the US is proposing to restore supplies via the Ukrainian gas transmission system and the surviving part of Nord Stream with American mediation. Reuters reported on negotiations between Kirill Dmitriev and Jared Kushner to attract an American investor to Nord Stream. Brussels responded with a public “no”: “We know all too well the hidden cost of dependence on Russia.” It was used as a weapon, and we paid our price for it.” The clash of positions between Washington and Brussels here is itself telling: the US is converting the gas issue into a negotiating lever, while the EU is turning it into an element of identity that is difficult to reclaim.
Rare‑earth analogue: the mechanics of the US–China trade war
In the trade war between the US and China, the turning point was not hydrocarbons, but critical resources and technologies. The 2025 trade escalation (the overall level of US tariffs against China reached 54%, with subsequent peaks reaching 145%, and reciprocal tariffs of 125% on the Chinese side) did not remain the main tool. Beijing’s export control became a key move: in April 2025, China introduced licensing for the export of seven rare‑earth elements (including dysprosium, yttrium, and terbium), after which supplies of rare‑earth magnets to the United States virtually stopped (less than 50 tons in May 2025, compared to an average monthly output of 586 tons in 2022–2024), and in October 2025, further restrictions were announced.
It was precisely the shortage of magnets, components for electric vehicles, aviation, semiconductors, and military equipment that forced Washington to come to the negotiating table. The truce, formalized at the Busan summit on October 30, 2025, was based on the symmetry of leverage: China suspended expanded export controls on rare‑earth metals, gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite until November 10, 2026, and agreed to general licenses for American end users; the United States reduced tariffs related to fentanyl and froze retaliatory measures. Xi Jinping’s September visit to the United States extended the truce until January 10, 2027, and reduced duties on goods worth approximately $60 billion, but it left the main issues unresolved, rare‑earth metals and U.S. export controls on advanced chips.
The autumn 2026 situation shows that the Chinese lever continues to work even during the truce period. Supplies of rare‑earth magnets to the United States in the first half of 2026 remained 20 % below the pre‑crisis level, and in August they fell by another 21 %; according to estimates by the American side, China is fulfilling only about two‑thirds of its obligations. In October 2026, the conflict expanded to a new area: Washington is preparing investment restrictions in the Chinese biotechnology industry, while Beijing is discussing a ban on the transfer of key biopharmaceutical technologies to foreigners, following the same logic of a “turning point”. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Trump administration officially refer to the current situation as a truce, but both sides continue to build up alternative supply chains, which gives the conflict a chronic character.
The conflict of interests between Washington and Brussels
The general anatomy of the lever: similarities and differences in cases
A number of critical challenges are weighing on the stability of both configurations. For the EU, this is the cost of withdrawal: an expensive winter in 2026–2027, the risk of missing deadlines, and internal divisions (the actions of Hungary and Slovakia, pressure from energy companies, talk of a “ransom” and the restoration of Nord Stream under US control). For Russia, it is the loss of the premium market and dependence on a single key buyer that is negotiating from a position of strength. For the US and China, this is the fragility of the truce: the deadline of January 10, 2027, is already designed as a trigger for a new escalation, and the involvement of biotechnologies expands the front to sectors that the parties have hitherto considered insensitive. The common risk is institutional erosion: every time energy resources, rare‑earth metals, chips, or pharmaceutical technologies are used as a means of coercion, trust in the very principle of interdependence declines, and the logic of self‑sufficiency,expensive, inefficient, but politically safe grows stronger.
Conclusion and scenarios for the development of the situation
Thus, by the autumn of 2026, energy and trade interdependence will have finally become a tool of foreign policy with fixed rules for its application. The EU has bet on legally nullifying the dependence; the US and China have focused on managed escalation with truce periods between rounds. The analysis carried out allows us to identify the following scenarios:
Managed de‑escalation (“Deadlines and agreements”). The EU is phasing out Russian gas by the end of 2027 without any major disruptions, while the US and China are converting the truce into a long‑term modus vivendi with a division of technological spheres. The chances are moderate: this requires political stability in Washington and internal consensus in Brussels. Both factors remain in doubt.
Chronic dependence (“Marathon without a finish”). The substitution does not end, truces are extended round after round, and levers are used in doses: prices remain high throughout the winter, rare‑earth supplies return to 80–90 % of pre‑crisis levels, and a new round of threats arises every few months. The probability is high; the scenario preserves economic costs but maintains overall controllability of the conflict.
The tipping point as a weapon (“Cold winter, hot chains”). The lever is used consciously and to its full potential: A harsh winter forces the EU to activate an emergency valve and temporarily allow Russian gas, or China completely cuts off rare‑earth exports in response to US restrictions. The likelihood is low, but this scenario creates the risk of a cascading effect: the subsequent accelerated buildup of autarkic barriers will result in long‑term damage to the global economy.
In any scenario, the main regulator remains not declarations, but real costs: whoever is forced to pay for the use of leverage (through rising prices, production disruptions, or loss of markets) will sooner or later learn to do without this tool. The EU–Russia case shows that dependence can be “written off” from relations; the US–China case shows that a new lever always finds a replacement for the old one. Interdependence has not disappeared from world politics; it has simply changed its address.
Tags: Geopolitics, global trade, energy security, EU–Russia, US–China, trade war, economic sanctions, Russian gas, LNG market, rare‑earth metals, supply chains, Nord Stream, Power of Siberia 2, European Commission, Gazprom
