The period 2024-2026 has become a time of rapid institutionalization for Russian-Chinese relations, superficially resembling the creation of a full-fledged alliance. Summits, intergovernmental commissions, industry sub-commissions, dozens of agreements and memoranda have formed an unprecedented dense fabric of bilateral ties. This review is intended to provide a holistic picture of the institutional contours of cooperation, critically reflect on its internal limitations and evaluate possible development scenarios.
Bilateral meetings
The mechanism of regular meetings of heads of State and Government remains the foundation of bilateral cooperation. In 2023-2025, the intensity of high-level contacts increased: in 2024 alone, three face-to-face meetings of the leaders took place, and telephone conversations were routine. President Vladimir Putin's visit to China (September 2025) ended with the signing of more than 20 agreements, from nuclear energy and space to agriculture and digital healthcare [1]. However, the real coordination has been reduced to the level of specialized institutions.
Russian business publications record the further consolidation of bilateral relations. So, in August 2025, the III International Forum "SPROUTS" was held in Kazan.: Russia and China – mutually beneficial cooperation", which brought together more than 10 thousand participants from 40 countries, 68 subjects of the Russian Federation and delegations from 28 administrative divisions of the PRC [2]. The key outcome of the forum was the signing of 34 agreements in the fields of industry, energy, logistics, tourism, science and culture, as well as the opening of the Chinese Investment Promotion Center in Kazan.
The 30th regular meeting of heads of Government (Hangzhou, November 2025) ended with the publication of a joint communique and the signing of 15 documents; the parties confirmed their intention to develop a Roadmap for scientific and technical cooperation for 2026-2030 with a special focus on artificial intelligence [3].
The formal institutionalization of the Russian-Chinese partnership in 2023-2026 has reached a high degree of maturity. However, this architecture is primarily of a framework nature. Key projects from the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline to the BRICS Bridge payment system, which have been under negotiation for years, and investment memoranda are not always converted into real investments. The political will demonstrated at the highest level is not automatically translated into operational solutions at the level of commercial banks, industrial corporations and logistics operators.
Energy Alliance
Energy remains the mainstay of bilateral relations. In 2024, Russia provided about 20% of China's oil needs (108 million tons, +1.3%) and 38% of China's pipeline gas imports ($8.03 billion for the Power of Siberia, +25% in monetary terms) [4]. In the first eight months of 2025, Gazprom increased gas supplies to China by 28.3% [5]. Commenting on the situation, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: "Cooperation between Russia and China in the energy sector is becoming closer and closer, filled with new content and acquiring the character of a strategic alliance" [6].
However, this alliance is vulnerable. After the United States imposed sanctions against Rosneft, Lukoil and a number of Chinese ports (Rizhao, Dongjiakou) in October 2025, Russian oil imports to China, according to Bloomberg estimates, could significantly decrease, and Chinese state-owned companies suspended purchases of oil and petroleum products [7]. Although some flows are recovering with the weakening of law enforcement control, the threat of secondary sanctions remains as one of the factors complicating relations between the two countries and increasing the risks of uncertainty in their development prospects.
Trading: correction and structural imbalances
The dynamics of trade turnover illustrates the adaptation cycles of partnership. After a historic high of $244.8 billion in 2024 (+1.9%), a correction occurred: in the first nine months of 2025, the drop was 9.4%, and by the end of the year, the volume decreased by 6.9% to $228 billion – for the first time since the pandemic in 2020 [8]. Lower prices for raw materials (70% of Russian exports to China), the high key rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and problems with cross-border settlements were the main reasons for the decline [9]. However, in the first quarter of 2026, trade increased by 12% to $39.4 billion, with exports of Chinese goods increasing by 22% [10].
These fluctuations conceal a structural imbalance: Russian exports retain a raw material character, while Chinese imports consist of machinery and equipment [11]. In this regard, the head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation notes that the period of China's "commodity expansion" into the Russian market is close to exhaustion due to saturation of demand, which requires a transition to joint production and technological transfer [12], and this, in turn, requires special attention to the investment direction in Russian-Chinese relations.
Financial track: the transition to the yuan, the problem of settlements and barriers to investment
By 2026, the share of national currencies in bilateral settlements in rubles and yuan reached 91% [13]. However, de-dollarization did not solve the fundamental problem: Chinese banks, fearing secondary sanctions, began to frequently reject payments from Russian counterparties in 2024. After falling under EU sanctions in September 2025, Heihe Rural Commercial Bank, one of the last banks serving Russia, stopped accepting payments, which caused difficulties in making payments [14].
The investment track is the most contrasting area of divergence between rhetoric and reality. Despite the rapid growth of trade turnover between the Russian Federation and China, the volume of accumulated Chinese direct investments in the Russian economy remains relatively modest and amounts, according to Katasonov, citing China Global Investment Tracker [15], to $34.2 billion – about 2.3% of China's total foreign assets.
According to CGIT (autumn 2025), Chinese assets in Russia are extremely unevenly distributed across sectors:
• Energy sector: $22.7 billion;
• Agriculture: $2.58 billion;
• Metallurgy: $2.45 billion;
• Real estate: $1.96 billion;
• Transportation: $1.39 billion;
• Finance: $1.20 billion;
• Chemical industry: $0.36 billion;
• Other sectors: $1.59 billion
The energy sector absorbs more than two thirds of all accumulated investments, reflecting the classic "resource exchange" model, where China gets access to raw materials and Russia gets access to capital. This concentration reproduces the peripheral model of Russia's inclusion in the global economy, but with a new center of gravity in China. Investments in high-tech sectors and the manufacturing industry are practically non-existent, which calls into question the declared goal of modernization through the attraction of Chinese capital.
Katasonov makes an illustrative comparison: in China's foreign trade turnover, Russia ranks only 5th (after the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam). However, Russia ranks 2nd in the world after the United States in terms of accumulated Chinese investments [15]. This paradox is explained by the fact that large projects in the energy and raw materials sectors are capital intensive, but at the same time Chinese investors avoid investments in a wider range of industries.
Analytical materials published in the Expert journal [16] specify the barriers. Chinese investors are facing a payment infrastructure problem: payment delays of 2-6 weeks due to Chinese banks' fears of secondary sanctions make long-term projects extremely risky. The high key rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (16.5%) and inflation (6.6–6.9%) require projects to yield above 20% per annum, which is difficult to achieve [16].
China itself, according to Katasonov, seeks to avoid secondary sanctions, preferring less visible forms of presence – through Hong Kong, joint ventures and trade loans, rather than direct investments [15]. Thus, political loyalty is not automatically converted into investment activity: Chinese capital acts rationally and cautiously, assessing risks and avoiding excessive dependence on the Russian market.
Katasonov points out that from the beginning of 2022 to the middle of 2025, accumulated FDI in Russia decreased from $497.7 billion to $216 billion, a drop of 57%. At the same time, the departure of Western investors was not compensated by the influx of Chinese capital: the niches vacated in the automotive industry (the share of Chinese brands in the market exceeded 50% of the number of names), retail and other sectors are filled mainly through imports rather than localization of production [15]. As noted in the article of the Expert magazine, more than 13 thousand are registered in Russia. companies with Chinese participation, however, the volume of their direct investments in the local economy, according to various estimates, does not exceed $3 billion per year [16]. This confirms the thesis that the Chinese presence is primarily commercial rather than investment in nature: companies are registered to facilitate import and export operations, rather than to create production facilities.
The sanctions regime creates a dual effect: on the one hand, it forces Russia to look for alternative sources of capital, on the other, the same sanctions deter potential investors from "friendly" countries from large–scale investments in the Russian economy. This leads to the formation of a "gray zone" of investment cooperation, where a significant part of the flows pass through opaque channels and offshore jurisdictions [15; 16].
Consequently, this situation creates an "institutional trap": the Russian state, in an effort to replace Western capital with eastern capital, is forced to create increasingly favorable conditions for Chinese investors (including the ratification in October 2025 of the updated intergovernmental agreement on the promotion and mutual protection of investments, which provides for the prevention of discriminatory measures and the creation of conditions no less favorable than for national investorsHowever, these measures do not lead to a significant increase in investments due to the continuing macroeconomic and political risks [15; 16].
Thus, the investment situation demonstrates that political proximity does not guarantee economic trust: Chinese capital, like any other, is guided by rational motives and risk assessment. The formation of sustainable investment ties requires not only political agreements, but also the creation of a transparent institutional environment, reducing transaction costs and ensuring real protection of investors' rights.
Military-strategic rapprochement
In the military sphere, the partnership was developing rapidly. So, in August 2025, the joint naval exercises "Maritime Interaction-2025" were held in the Sea of Japan near Vladivostok [18]. During the three-day maneuvers, submarine rescue, anti-submarine warfare, air defense and missile defense were practiced. Commenting on these and subsequent exercises, one can note the growing level of military-technical coherence between the militaries of the two countries against the background of the proliferation of high-precision long-range weapons in Europe and Asia. In addition, in late 2025 and early 2026, Russia and China conducted the third round of joint missile defense exercises on Russian territory, which were preceded by negotiations on missile defense and strategic stability. These maneuvers were a continuation of artillery and anti-submarine exercises in the Sea of Japan [19]. At the same time, foreign policy rhetoric invariably emphasizes that cooperation is not directed against third countries. However, the regularity and scale of the maneuvers signal the formation of a de facto military-strategic axis opposing Western alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.
Multilateral cooperation formats
The key institutional formats in which Russian-Chinese cooperation unfolds are the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both associations are considered by Moscow and Beijing as tools for the formation of a "post-Western" world order [22]. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu called these formats an example of interstate cooperation based on mutual respect and reflecting the interests of the global majority.
The SCO is a unique platform for Eurasian cooperation, focused on synchronizing regional security and economic progress. The key feature of the organization is a "two—wheeled model" that integrates security and economics into a single management mechanism.
Within the SCO, Russia and China perform complementary functions based on competitive advantages: Russia specializes in military and political stability, counter-terrorism, peacemaking and border strengthening, while China specializes in transport infrastructure, digitalization, energy networks and economic development. This combination of power and economic resources creates an innovative format of "asymmetric synergy" that minimizes competition and maximizes the functionality of the organization.
Unlike the SCO, BRICS is a global-scale association that does not have a rigid organizational structure, but has a pronounced regional dimension. By 2026, BRICS has expanded to 10 full members, covering 42% of the world's population and about 30% of the Earth's territory [23].
From the point of view of organizational relations, the BRICS operates in the format of consensual five–sided (and now ten-sided) interaction, where priority is given to forums, summits and regular meetings of representatives of various fields. In 2026, the BRICS presidency passed to India.
The key elements of Russian-Chinese cooperation within the framework of the BRICS are the following [23]:
• The New BRICS Development Bank, which positions itself as an alternative to Western financial institutions.
• Deoffshorization and de-dollarization, which involves the promotion of alternative financial institutions through the SCO, BRICS and the EAEU.
• Coordination in the field of culture and sports.
The most important format of interaction is the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the New Silk Road Economic Belt, which began in 2015 [24]. This initiative, put forward by the two heads of state, opens up the possibility of creating a new modern system of institutions for broad Eurasian integration. This creates the basis for the "Greater Eurasian Partnership" – combining integrations into a single contour that increases the stability of the regional system.
It should also be emphasized that the existing Russian-Chinese partnership, including within the framework of multilateral institutions, is based on consensus around three agendas – multipolarity, globalization and building a world order. However, substantial differences remain within this consensus. Multipolarity is interpreted by the parties "not as an end goal, but as a path to building an honest and just international order" [20], with China tending to gradually improve existing institutions and not seeking to escalate tensions with Washington or the EU, while Russia is looking for systemic alternatives to Western financial and technological ecosystems, demonstrating interest in developing a joint strategies for countering sanctions and coordinating appropriate actions with partners [21]. It is these differences in foreign policy strategies that significantly affect the forms and methods of cooperation between Russia and China, setting certain boundaries for them.
Conclusion
The Russian-Chinese partnership of 2024-2026 is a complex institutional phenomenon. On the one hand, it demonstrates an unprecedented density of political contacts and organizational mechanisms, creating the impression of a strategic alliance. On the other hand, key economic parameters (trade, investment, finance, technology) reveal a deep asymmetry: Russia is entrenched in the position of a supplier of natural resources to Chinese industrial capital, which limits the possibilities of its own industrial and technological development. China, in turn, retains the ability to selectively regulate the depth of interaction depending on its own pragmatic interests.
Today, the Russian-Chinese partnership is an unfinished institutional project. Formal institutions have been created, but their operational content is blocked by sanctions risks and diverging strategic cultures. The sustainability of the partnership in the long term will be determined not by the number of signed memoranda, but by Moscow's ability to diversify foreign economic relations and build truly mutually beneficial cooperation formats.
Taking into account the identified structural constraints, the dynamics of institutionalization and external pressure, two scenarios can be identified for the further evolution of the Russian-Chinese partnership in the horizon up to 2030. Each of them describes a different configuration of mutual adaptation of organizational practices, economic relations and foreign policy priorities.
Scenario 1 (inertial). In this scenario, the partnership continues to develop along the established track. The trade turnover between the two countries remains at a high level, and its dynamics continues to be determined by the conjuncture of commodity markets and the state of bilateral relations at the highest level. China retains the status of a dominant trading partner, but Russia's share in China's exports remains insignificant and its share in imports remains critically high. Investment cooperation is characterized by an increase in the number of small and medium-sized enterprises with Chinese participation, while large state-owned companies refrain from large-scale investments. The financial landscape is anchored in a dual mode: official authorities report on de-dollarization, and businesses adapt to "manual management" of payments. From an organizational point of view, this leads to the consolidation of informal practices — agency chains and offsets that compensate for the dysfunctions of formal institutions, but at the same time preserve the situation.
The sanctions pressure is not easing, however, it does not exceed the critical threshold beyond which China would be forced to make a tough choice. Beijing continues to combine political rhetoric about the inadmissibility of unilateral sanctions with the cautious behavior of large banks. For Moscow, this scenario means maintaining the status quo: surviving under permanent external pressure, but without making a qualitative leap towards economic diversification or equitable technological partnership.
The key risk of the inertial scenario is the gradual consolidation of an institutional trap, in which a high density of intergovernmental contacts masks the stagnation of real cooperation. Numerous memoranda create the illusion of progress, but they do not transform into joint production and technology transfer.
Scenario 2 (breakthrough). This scenario assumes a qualitative transition from an asymmetric exchange of resources to joint production and technological cooperation. Its implementation requires the coincidence of several favorable factors.
First, it is necessary to regulate the price and infrastructure parameters of the Power of Siberia-2 with the start of practical construction. This would create a long-term contractual framework for energy interdependence and free up resources for non-resource sectors. Secondly, the full scaling of the BRICS Bridge and the integration of national payment systems should ensure uninterrupted cross-border settlements for all categories of economic agents, including medium-sized businesses, eliminating the shortage of yuan liquidity and reducing dependence on intermediary schemes. Thirdly, the easing of sanctions pressure – either as a result of the global international political restructuring (the US transition to "great power cooperation", fixed by the Trump administration at the end of 2025), or as a result of the steady adaptation of both countries to sanctions regimes — would open up space for large Chinese investments.
In this scenario, Chinese state-owned companies are starting to invest in Russian industry and technology (microelectronics, aircraft manufacturing, artificial intelligence), and not just in financial services and mining. The Intergovernmental Agreement on Investment Protection is starting to work in full force, ensuring the predictability of the legal environment. The institutional architecture is being filled with real content: science and technology roadmaps for 2026-2030 are being converted into joint ventures.
In general, the implementation of this scenario would mean a convergence of strategic cultures – a convergence of Moscow and Beijing's approaches to globalization and methods of transforming the world order. So far, this has not been observed: Russia tends to significantly restructure the institutions of the global economy, while China, on the contrary, tends to "gradually improve" the established institutions. However, the very fact of jointly resisting sanctions pressure is able to gradually bring operational practices closer together, as is already happening in the military-strategic sphere (joint exercises and military-technical smoothing). If a similar process is launched in the economic sphere, the partnership will be able to move from the phase of an unfinished project to the phase of a mature institutional complex.
At the same time, in order to implement this scenario, Moscow needs not only to negotiate with Beijing, but also to pursue an internal economic policy aimed at reducing dependence on raw materials and normalizing the socio-economic situation (making it stable and predictable for all participants in economic relations, citizens and businesses). Without this, Chinese investments will not find an adequate institutional environment to take root. At the same time, it is necessary to build an industrial policy to create autonomy in critical industries and ensure prospects for further technological development.
