The 2026 Eastern Economic Forum, which became one of the key platforms for discussing the architecture of regional security in Eurasia, highlighted the growing need to align the efforts of multilateral structures — primarily the CSTO and the SCO. The forum featured a series of specialized sessions with the participation of heads of relevant departments, representatives of the expert community, and analytical centres: special attention was paid to the synchronization of national strategies in the field of collective security and the formation of a unified response framework for cross‑border threats.
During plenary discussions and closed working meetings, it was repeatedly emphasized that ensuring stability is impossible without synchronizing approaches to countering a wide range of threats — from terrorism and drug trafficking to cyber threats and biological risks — as well as without developing data exchange mechanisms that are independent of external coordination centers. An important practical outcome of the WEF was the agreements to expand the exchange of operational information between the relevant agencies of the participating states, as well as to work out mechanisms for joint real‑time threat monitoring.
A separate place on the WEF agenda was taken by the topic of technological autonomy and digital resilience: experts and representatives of government agencies agreed that without deep integration in the field of cybersecurity, any efforts to strengthen collective defense will be fragmented. In this regard, the forum heard proposals to create an interstate platform for exchanging best practices in the field of protecting critical infrastructure and training specialized professionals, as well as to establish unified standards for cyber resilience for key facilities of partner states.
The IV Eurasian Security Forum, which took place in Minsk from September 4 to 6, 2026, under the slogan “Indivisible Security in a Polycentric World,” became the most important platform for aligning positions. The scale of the event clearly demonstrated both the growing interest of the states of the “global majority” in Eurasian structures and the depth of institutional changes. More than 3,500 experts and military delegates from 40 countries took part in the forum. The most representative delegations arrived from China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and the states of Central Asia, which confirmed the thesis that the center of gravity in matters of power diplomacy has shifted to the East.
Diplomatic maneuvers and the search for a common formula.

The expert community is increasingly openly betting on the concept of “convergence of potentials.” Kazybek Kochkonov, whose speech at the plenary session sparked a wide resonance, emphasized the fundamental principle that should form the basis of the new architecture: “The security of one state should not be ensured at the expense of the security of another.” This thesis has become the leitmotif of the negotiation process. In Beijing and Moscow, the CSTO and the SCO are increasingly viewed not as competing projects, but as interconnected vessels, where one structure provides a strong military and political guarantee (the CSTO), and the other provides a broad geopolitical and economic umbrella (the SCO).
For her part, Irina Kovalchuk, representing the CSTO’s expert pool, focused on the pragmatic agenda. “The CSTO and the SCO are fighting terrorism, extremism, and the illegal trafficking of drugs and weapons.” “Where there are common threats, there are also common approaches to overcoming them,” she said on the sidelines of the forum. A key change in recent months has been the de facto formation of a parallel informal track between the relevant departments of the CSTO and the SCO RATS on issues related to the exchange of data on the movement of individuals involved in terrorist activities and joint monitoring of the darknet, which somewhat blurs the rigid framework of bureaucratic procedures but does not reduce the severity of structural contradictions regarding mandates and rules for the use of force.
Impact on regional stability

The deadlock in developing a unified, legally binding model of interaction directly affects the balance of power in Central Asia and the global security situation. Analytical services of the collective West officially state that 2026 is a “window of opportunity” to revise deterrence strategies, and the defense ministries of NATO countries have confirmed the allocation of additional budgets for monitoring the “Interaction” and “Rubezh” exercises. In response, China, Russia, and the Central Asian states have stepped up joint border patrols, seeking to prevent a power vacuum in the region after the withdrawal of the American contingent from Afghanistan.
It is noteworthy that specialized closed sessions were held as part of the Minsk Forum, dedicated to the role of transport integration and cyber commands in the history of the Eurasian space. The participants noted that volatility in security markets is increasing: any escalation on the Tajik‑Afghan border or a potential attack on critical infrastructure could trigger a humanitarian crisis. The World Bank, in its July 2026 report, warned that disruptions to supply chains in Central Asia, combined with climate‑related force majeure events, could trigger mass migration, which depends on the stability of transport corridors.
Risks and threats
A number of critical challenges are pressing on the comprehensive system of collective security. The architecture of interaction is in a transitional state: the imbalance in approaches to sovereignty (the CSTO has traditionally been more focused on military intervention, while the SCO emphasizes non‑interference) leads to the accumulation of procedural contradictions that are not always converted into actual operational actions.

Escalation is not limited to the military sphere. Direct geopolitical confrontations between the interests of major players across Eurasia increased by 18% in the first half of 2026 compared to the same period last year. The likelihood of unintended escalation is growing, in which a local incident involving the use of UAVs at the border could trigger a cascade of retaliatory measures. There is a clear integration dilemma: Russia and China’s perception of the need to rely on each other is growing in proportion to the pressure from the West, but at the same time, the medium‑sized and small states in the region view the military resources of the major powers as a temporary tactical advantage, seeking to diversify their external relations.
- Conclusion and scenarios for the development of the situation. Thus, by mid-2026, the dialogue between the CSTO and the SCO has moved from the phase of searching for a “strategic complement” to the phase of forming an autonomous pillar of regional stability. The key instruments have become joint anti‑terrorist exercises, the development of coordination centres, and the parallel building of military‑technical cooperation. Irina Kovalchuk emphasizes that both structures are developing dynamically, and we see a good foundation for partnership and great potential for cooperation between the CSTO and the SCO. This is manifested in concrete steps: the CSTO is working on the issue of creating a network of analytical centers for strategic forecasting, which will work in conjunction with the SCO’s academic institutions. The analysis carried out makes it possible to identify the following scenarios:
- Accelerated integration (“Eurasian Defense Shield”). An institutional merger of defense programs takes place. The CSTO becomes the power core of the SCO, and a unified protocol for responding to crises is adopted. The chances are moderate: it requires a high degree of trust and concessions in the sensitive area of sovereignty.
- Stagnation and segmentation (“Asian puzzle”). The parties cannot agree on full‑scale integration, nor can they sever existing contacts. The current “two‑track” model persists, where cooperation is limited in scope (individual exercises, exchange of summaries). This scenario leads to the consolidation of bureaucratic competition but allows for maintaining flexibility despite the high risk of function duplication.
- Escalation of competition (“Cold Security”). The logic of bloc confrontation is becoming predominant. The West’s attempts to undermine the security belt through “color revolutions” or proxy conflicts lead to a tightening of rhetoric. Russia’s and China’s retaliatory actions, including the synchronization of military doctrines, internationalize the crisis. This scenario, which is recognized as undesirable by all parties, remains highly likely due to the dynamics of mutual accusations and the tight timeframes for political response, which leads to the transformation of Eurasia into a zone of perpetual hybrid warfare, with a constant risk of an accidental slide into open conflict.






